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We propose a local scheme to enhance the security of quantum key distribution in Ekert protocol
(E91). Our proposal is a fair sampling test meant to detect an eavesdropping attempt that would
use a biased sample to mimic an apparent violation of Bell inequalities. The test is local and non
disruptive: it can be unilaterally performed at any time by either Alice or Bob during the production
of the key, and together with the Bell inequality test.
INTRODUCTION
Ekert protocol [1–3] uses entangled states to guaran-
tee the secrecy of a key distributed to two parties (Alice
and Bob). Identical measurements performed on a maxi-
mally entangled state yield perfect correlation, which can
be used to produce a shared key; while the secrecy of the
key can be guaranteed by the violation of Bell inequalities
measured for non-identical measurements. An uncondi-
tional violation of Bell inequalities would guarantee that
no local (hidden) variables exist that an eavesdropper
(Eve) could exploit. It would mean unconditional pri-
vacy: Eve could have full control of the detectors and the
source, more advanced theory and technology, it would
still be secure [2].
However, practical implementations of Ekert protocol
have to be performed with photons, because a key dis-
tribution protocol is useful only if Alice and Bob can
be separated by macroscopic distances [4]. Photons are
also restricted by the use of polarizing beam splitter to
a wavelength domain for which standard photon coun-
ters have a poor detection efficiency [5, 6]. It means that
a rather heavy postselection is required: Alice and Bob
must discard all measurements for which either of them
failed to register a click at all [2]. The trouble is that lo-
cal hidden-variable models that exploit this weakness can
reproduce exactly the predictions of Quantum Mechanics
[7], as soon as the detection efficiency is lower than 83%
[8–11]. In the context of experiments on the foundations
of Quantum Mechanics, the assumption of Fair Sampling
is usually considered reasonable to support a violation of
Bell inequalities, with the idea that Nature is not con-
spiratory. In Quantum Key Distribution however, Eve is
expected to conspire [12]. Alice and Bob should therefore
assume that their sample is biased by Eve. Failure to ac-
knowledge this weakness would leave all freedom to Eve
to exploit it with a biased sample attack: the statistics on
the detected sample would then only have the appearance
of secrecy. This weakness should not be underestimated
given that a successful quantum hacking has already been
successfully implemented experimentally by means of a
time-shifting attack [13].
Alice Bob
FIG. 1. Standard Ekert protocol. Alice and Bob randomly
switch their measurement settings. Pairs associated with
identical measurement settings (ϕA = ϕB) are used to pro-
duce a correlated key, while those associated to non-identical
measurement settings (ϕA 6= ϕB) are used to check the vio-
lation of Bell inequality (and the security of the key).
Naturally, this issue becomes critical if Eve manufac-
tured the detectors, which means that Alice and Bob
should thoroughly check that their detectors are func-
tioning according to specifications [2]. However, we will
argue here that even if the detectors owned by Alice and
Bob are genuine photomultipliers or avalanche photodi-
odes, Eve could still in principle force a biased sampling
on these detectors by exploiting the thresholds of these
detectors. Eve would only need to control the source and
know the detectors well enough to exploit their thresh-
olds, but she would not need to actually control them.
We will thus propose below a fair sampling test to pre-
vent such a biased-sample attack on threshold detectors.
A BIASED-SAMPLE ATTACK ON EKERT
PROTOCOL
The motivation and concern for the possibility of a
biased-sample attack is that avalanche photodiodes and
photomultipliers are fundamentally threshold detectors.
At the input, the energy must be higher than the band
gap to trigger an avalanche or a photoelectron; while at
the output, the current must be higher than a discrimi-
nator value to be counted as a click [14]. This combined
threshold could be exploited by Eve to obtain an appar-
2ent violation of Bell inequalities on the detected sample
[15].
We will assume throughout this paper that the source
is controlled by Eve, that she can produce pulses that
split classically according to Malus law in polarizing
beamsplitters, and that these pulses are sensitive to the
threshold in Alice’s and Bob’s detector. How Eve will ef-
fectively produce such pulses is left to her, but it should
be stressed that if each pulse contains at most one particle
then the biased sampling described here would be inef-
fective, because the energy seen at a detector would al-
ways be the same regardless of the measurement settings.
Eve could for instance produce pulses with several pho-
tons of lower frequencies, possibly using non-linearities
in threshold detectors [16].
We will consider here simple models of threshold de-
tectors: ideal threshold detectors, which produce a click
with certainty if the energy E of the absorbed pulse is
greater than a threshold Φ; and linear threshold detector,
which produce a click with a probability increasing lin-
early with the energy above a threshold Φ (possibly with
a saturation value after which the probability no longer
increases).
The simplest way for Eve to obtain an apparent viola-
tion of Bell inequalities reproducing exactly the predic-
tions of Quantum Mechanics on the detected sample is to
aim at reproducing the asymmetrical detection pattern
of a Larsson-Gisin model [11, 17]. Those models are ad
hoc, but it is in fact relatively straightforward for Eve to
obtain these patterns with classical pulses and threshold
detectors.
For this purpose, Eve sends pairs of correlated pulses
with energy E0 and polarization λ, where λ is a
random variable uniformly distributed on the interval
[−pi/2, pi/2]. Then she just needs to make sure that on
one side (say, Alice) the detectors are ideal threshold de-
tectors with E0 = 2Φ, while the other side (Bob) the de-
tectors are linear threshold detectors, also with E0 = 2Φ.
With the condition E0 = 2Φ, Malus’ Law is cut by the
bottom precisely at the intersection of the two channels
(at |ϕ−λ| = pi/4). Consequently, Alice’s always records a
click in exactly one channel: channel 1 if |ϕA−λ| < pi/4,
channel 0 otherwise; whereas on Bob’s side the probabil-
ity to get a click in the channel 1 varies with cos 2(ϕB−λ)
when |ϕB − λ| < pi/4, and with sin 2(ϕB − λ) when
|ϕB − λ| > pi/4 in channel 0. The crucial feature of
the resulting detection pattern is that the probability to
obtain a click in either channel on Bob’s side depends
explicitly on λ: it is maximum for |ϕB − λ| = 0, and de-
creases down to zero for |ϕB−λ| = pi/4. The sampling is
thus unfair, or biased, and leads to an apparent violation
of Bell inequalities on the detected sample [11, 15, 17].
An eavesdropping strategy would therefore consist in
replacing the source of entangled photons with a classi-
cal source of pulsed pairs correlated in polarization and
designed to meet condition E0 = 2Φ. If Eve aims at
reproducing the full correlation function as predicted by
Quantum Mechanics, she would have to make sure that
at one station (say, Alice) the threshold detectors react
ideally to the pulses, whereas at the other station (Bob)
the threshold detectors react linearly. However, if Alice
and Bob are only measuring a few points of the corre-
lation function (those giving maximum violation of Bell
inequality), as is done in Ekert protocol, Eve can lift this
constraint and work with identical threshold detectors on
both sides (either linear or ideal). Alice and Bob would
then observe a maximal violation of Bell inequalities on
the subset of detected pairs, and would thus wrongly be-
lieve that their key is secure while in fact Eve’s knowledge
would in principle be maximum.
COUNTERMEASURE: A FAIR SAMPLING TEST
In order to prevent Eve from using this attack, the
obvious solution consists in increasing the efficiency to
reach 83%. However, this proves difficult with thresh-
old detectors. Decreasing the band gap threshold—or
increasing the operating temperature—does increase the
efficiency of the detectors, but only at the cost of higher
dark count rates. Unless special detectors operating near
absolute zero temperature are used, such as Transition-
Edge Sensors (which are too cumbersome and slow to be
practical solution to QKD), this can be considered a gen-
eral rule that applies to any detectors, and fundamentally
limits their efficiencies.
Another suggestion is to artificially complete the de-
tected sample by randomly assigning 0 or 1 to non-
detected pulses [18], so that the required efficiency to
produce a useful key is lowered to 50%. However, we
would like to argue that the drawback of this method is
that introducing some random results would be bound to
decrease the violation of Bell inequality measured on the
completed sample, thus preventing a security check of the
key unless one does so on the uncompleted sample (which
would again reintroduce the 83% efficiency bound).
Our proposal consists in testing the fairness of the sam-
ple by analyzing the output channels of the polarizing
beamsplitters, instead of simply feeding detectors with
them. We keep the standard design of Ekert protocol,
with two polarizing beamsplitters on each side (Alice and
Bob) projecting the incoming pulses on random bases ϕA
and ϕB, as depicted on Fig. 1, but we replace each de-
tectors by a polarimeter [19]: a polarizing beamsplitter
followed by a detector at each output. Consider Alice’s
side (see Fig. 2). We label the polarimeter in channel 1 as
A1, the orientation of its polarizing beam-splitter as θA1 ,
and the detectors in the transmitted and reflected output
as A+1 and A
−
1 respectively. Similarly, the polarimeter in
channel 0 is labeled A0, the orientation of its polarizing
beam-splitter θA0 , and the detectors in the transmitted
and reflected output are A+0 and A
−
0 respectively. Bob
3Alice
Source
FIG. 2. Fair Sampling test on Alice’s side. The detector in
channel 1 is replaced by a polarimeter A1 with two detectors
A+1 and A
−
1 having the same efficiency η. The detector in
channel 0 is replaced by a polarimeter A0 with two detectors
A+0 and A
−
0 , also with efficiency η. Ekert protocol is thus
unaltered by our test: polarimeter A1 is equivalent to the
detector in channel 1 in Fig. 1, with the same efficiency η,
and polarimeter A0 is equivalent to the detector in channel
0 with efficiency η. Similar results would be obtained for
polarimeter A0, and for Bob’s polarimeters.
would proceed similarly with two polarimeters labeled B1
and B0.
In case of a genuine source of entangled photons, noth-
ing is changed for Ekert protocol, as long as all the de-
tectors have the same efficiency η. Each polarimeter can
then be considered as one detector with quantum effi-
ciency η. The polarimeter A1 can be seen as one single
detector in channel 1, in which the orientation θA1 has no
influence on the result: a photon exiting the polarizing
beam-splitter ϕA through channel 1 will be detected in
either output channel of polarimeter A1 with a probabil-
ity η. Similarly, polarimeter A0 can be seen as one single
detector in channel 0, where the orientation θA0 plays no
role whatsoever, and the same goes for Bob’s setup. The
production of the key and the verification of the violation
of Bell inequalities is thus unaltered by our fair sampling
test setup in case of a genuine source of entangled pho-
tons, because the additional measurement settings θA1 ,
θA0 , θB1 and θB1 controlled by Alice and Bob have no in-
fluence on the measurement results in case of a genuine
source of entangled photons.
However, they have a strong influence in the case of a
biased-sample attack by Eve. Let us consider the simpler
case of ideal threshold detectors mentioned above. By
Malus law, the energy of the pulse reaching Alice’s A+1
detector is
E
A
+
1
= E0 cos
2(ϕA − θA1) cos
2(ϕA − λ). (1)
Starting from a uniform distribution of the polariza-
tion λ of pulses on the circle, we write that |Pλdλ| =
|P
A
+
1
(E
A
+
1
)dE
A
+
1
|, so that the probability to get an en-
ergy between E
A
+
1
and E
A
+
1
+ dE
A
+
1
in the A+ channel
is given by
P
A
+
1
(E
A
+
1
)dE
A
+
1
=
dE
A
+
1
pi
√
(Emax − EA+
1
)E
A
+
1
(2)
where Emax = E0 cos
2(ϕA−θA1) is the maximum energy
reaching the detector (by Malus’ law).
The probability to obtain a click in an ideal thresh-
old detector placed at the transmitted output (+) of po-
larimeter A1 is then simply the integral of this density
distribution over the energy reaching the detector, from
the threshold Φ to Emax:
P
A
+
1
(E0,Φ) =
∫ Emax
Φ
dE
A
+
1
pi
√
(Emax − EA+
1
)E
A
+
1
(3)
=
2
pi
arccos
√
Φ
E0 cos2(ϕA − θA1)
. (4)
Similarly the probability to obtain a click in an ideal
threshold detector positioned at the reflected output (−)
of polarimeter A1 is
P
A
−
1
(E0,Φ) =
2
pi
arccos
√
Φ
E0 sin
2(ϕA − θA1)
. (5)
In the case of linear threshold detectors, the analyt-
ical results are more complicated since the probability
to get a click for an energy E + dE is not always equal
to 1, but the principle of calculation remains the same:
integrate the product of the probability density distribu-
tion by the probability of obtaining a click for a given
energy. The analytical results for linear threshold are
qualitatively similar to that of ideal threshold detectors.
The results in the case E0 = 2Φ—which is leading to a
violation of Bell inequalities exactly reproducing the pre-
dictions of Quantum Mechanics—are displayed in Fig. 3:
the probability to get a click in polarimeter A1 depends
on |ϕA− θA1 |. It is maximum for |ϕA− θA1 | = 0+ kpi/2,
and reaches zero for |ϕA − θA1 | = pi/4 + kpi/2. Simi-
lar results would be obtained for polarimeter A0, and for
Bob’s polarimeters.
This fair sampling test can be implemented very sim-
ply on Alice’s side by fixing θA1 = θA0 = 0. The random
switching in Ekert protocol (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2) ensures
that the points at 0 and pi/4 are both scanned automat-
ically. Any significant difference in the number of single
counts recorded when ϕA = 0 and ϕA = pi/4 would be-
tray Eve’s attempt to bias the sample through a biased-
sample attack on the threshold detectors. Similarly, Bob
would chose θB1 = θB0 = pi/8, and compare the number
of singles when ϕB = −pi/8 and ϕB = pi/8.
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FIG. 3. Analytical Results in case of biased-sample attack
on threshold detectors in Alice’s polarimeter A1, with E0 =
2Φ. The probability to get a click in A1 depends on |ϕA −
θA1 |. From 0 to
pi
4
and from 3pi
4
to pi, only detector A+1 can
click, whereas from pi
4
to 3pi
4
only detector A−1 can click. By
contrast, in case of a genuine source of entangled photons,
the probability to get a click in these channels is governed by
Malus law’s cos2(ϕA − θA1) and sin
2(ϕA − θA1) (not shown
here), and the probability to get a click in either channel
therefore adds up to a constant independent of |ϕA − θA1 |.
CONCLUSION
Our fair sampling test can be implemented during the
production of the key and together with the violation of
Bell inequality check, so that it seems hard to bypass it
without reducing the visibility of the correlation. For in-
stance, increasing the energy of the pulses with respect
to the threshold would tend to reduce the dip in the fair
sampling test, but it would give rise to double counts
and reduce the visibility of the correlation at the same
time (weaker violation of Bell inequalities). The combi-
nation of a Bell inequality test with a monitoring of the
double counts and our local fair sampling test therefore
constitutes a solid scheme against eavesdropping a E91
protocol using a biased-sample attack. It should also be
noted that the use of four detectors on each side can serve
other purposes, like shielding Alice and Bob from a time-
shift attack [20]. In principle, similar fair sampling tests
could be implemented in other QKD protocol, by replac-
ing passive detectors in each channel by a device with
the same efficiency that would analyze further whichever
degree of freedom is used to encode the key, instead of
simply feeding detectors with it.
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